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LABOUR RELATIONS - A TAKEOVER 
BY THE STATE ? 
The New Zealand Experience 
• JAMES A. FARMER 
THE ROLE OF LAW IN LABOUR RELATIONS 
The debate on the question of the role of law in labour relati ons is 
not new. At the one extreme, there is the oft quoted statement of 
Professor Wedderburn that "Most workers want nothing more of the law 
than it should leave them alone" so that "legal sanction and lawyers make 
their greatest contribution to industrial life by being sel f-effacing rat her 
than obtrusive.' '1 To similar effect is Professor Kahn-Freund: 
" Tne desrre of both sides of indus-
try to provide for, and to operate an 
effective system rs a stronger 
guarantee of industnat peace and of 
a smooth function of labour-manage-
ment relations than any action legislat-
ors or Courts or enforcement officers 
can ever hope to undertake."2 
Such warnmgs do not, however. deter 
legislators and polrtrcians from invoking 
law as a maJor means of establishmg and 
marntarnmg a greater degree of stability 
and peace rn mdustrial life. In movmg the 
second reading of the 1976 Industrial Rela-
tions Amendment Bill (No. 3) (whrch con-
tained many new restrictrons on strike 
action) a New Zealand Cabinet Minrster 
claimed that law must ·act as a deterrent 
to those bent on recalcrtrant or destructive 
action." Srmllarly, the Presrdent of the 
United Kmgdom Natrona! Industrial Rela-
tions Court had thrs to say in 1972 when 
fining the Transport and General Workers 
Union £55,000: 
"Without the rule of law and Courts 
to enforce it, each one of us would be 
free to push and bully our fellow citi-
zens and, which may be thought more 
important) our fellow citizens would be 
free to push and bully us. In a fre&-
for-all none of us would hope to be 
the wrnner The JUStification for law, 
the Courts and the nule of law is that 
they protect us from unfarr and oppres-
srve actrons by others; but If we are 
to have that protection we must our-
selves accept that the law applies to 
us, too , and limits our freedom. In 
civrlised countries nearly everyone 
accepts thrs and agrees that Is a small 
price to pay. There remain the few 
who want to use the laws which suit 
them and disobey those which do not. 
If the rule of law is to have any mean-
rng , the Courts must In the last resort 
take actron against these few end 
rmpose some penalty " 3 
The fining of, and imposition of lnjunc· 
lions on, trade unions and their leaders 
has brought into sharp focus the conflict 
which exists between the philosophy that 
all must obey the law (and that unions In 
particular are not above the law) and the 
view that the protagonists of labour rela-
tions should be left alone to reach their 
own solutions by way of negotiatron, med-
iation and collective bargaining There 
have been any number of instances in 
recent years, not only in the United King-
dom but also in Australia, New Zealand 
and other countries, where there has been 
resrstance by unions to the enforcement of 
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Court orders aga1nst them. where union 
off1c1als have been Imprisoned as a con-
sequence and where Widespread strike 
action has resulted or been threatened 
In each instance, Government intervention 
has normally followed and an explosive 
situation defused by means of a conciliated 
settlement of the original dispute or by the 
setting up of ad hoc machinery for resolv· 
mg the dispute. 
It Is tempting to conclude from these 
Instances that law Is at worst harmful and 
at best Irrelevant in the field of Industrial 
relations. More than sixty·f1ve years ago, 
the great philosopher Ehrlich in fact warn· 
ed that legal rules and Court decisions 
had no substantial efficacy on the conduct 
of workers "Law suit and compulsory 
execution are to (the worker) little more 
than mere words,' he said, compared with 
the non-legal norms of the workplace which 
dictate his behaviour and conduct. Accord-
mg to Ehrlich, the fear of dismissal and 
unemployment, the desire for promotion 
and, most Importantly, h1s affiliation to his 
fellow workers (especially through the 
medium of a trade union) prov1de the true 
explanation of his willingness to cont1nue 
at his workplace and the manner in which 
he does sa.• 
One of the difficulties w1th the debate 
about the role of law In labour relations 
is that it is overly simplistic. Views become 
polarised on all fronts. I suspect that the 
views of those who claim to be opponents 
of legal regulation are strongly coloured 
oy the Injunction or penalty cases. Their 
horizons probably do not extend beyond 
these instances. Thus they will not for 
example have in mind the fact that In most 
countries it has proved necessary to enact 
factories and machinery legislation for the 
safety of workers These were matters that 
were originally the subject of negotiation 
between unions and employers but the 
problems surrounding the settlement of 
such Issues in that manner ultimately led 
to State intervention and the assumpt10n 
of Governmental responsibility for ensur-
Ing that adequate standards were attained 
by employers. The means adopted was law 
On the other nand. those who clamour 
for law, or more law, often fail to distln 
gulsh between law as enacted on the 
statute book and Its elf1cacy as Implement-
ed. Too often Industrial taws have been 
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enacted wh1ch are Ignored and forgotten 
and which therefore only serve to create 
an unhealthy void between the theoretical 
system and that wh1ch operates 10 practice 
Law does not of course permeate or 
regulate all Industrial relat1ons act1v1hes 
When the industnal relations f1eld is viewed 
as a whole, it will be seen that there are a 
number of areas of employer-employee re-
lations which have been regulated or 
determined by quite dtfferent means. 
Broadly speaking, there are for example 
matters which have traditionally been the 
subject of collective bargain1ng between 
unions and employers, wtth little or com-
paratively little legal direction Thus, at 
least until recent times, wage rates tended 
to be fixed by bargaining and negotiation 
with little external influence other than that 
of rates fixed in a s1mHar manner in other 
mdustnes. Conditions of employment relat-
mg to such matters as entitlement to sick 
pay, travelling allowances and so forlh 
were also treated 1n this way 
There are other areas where the Jaw 
has also been largely reticent but which 
have not been the subject of collective 
bargainrng. These Include such matters of 
employer or company policy as to what 
will be produced or manufactured and 
how it will be marketed. the establishment 
:>f systems of work. the allocation of work 
and so forth. These (and others like them) 
have traditionally been regarded as falling 
withm the general rubnc of employer or 
managerial prerogative 
It is the purpose of this paper to show 
that 1n recent years qu1te dramat1c changes 
have become evident in the customary 
handling of 1ndustnal relations matters In 
particular, disputes and claims that were 
formerly the subrect of collective bargain-
ing between employers and unions have 
ncreasingly been taken out of that domain 
and made the subject of legal regulation 
Further and probably as a consequence 
of that development. unions have begun 
o lay claim to ereas of managerial prerog· 
at1ve and to asserl a right to bargain over 
m21tters that were previously regarded as 
bemg outside theJr junsdiction But these 
lso are areas where developments 11"'1 legal 
regulation already threaten to overlake the 
Incipient and tardy attempts by the trade 
umons to assert bargaining rights. 
In describmg and tracing these recent 
je 
lW 
(8 
developments, particular attention will be 
patd in this paper to the situation In New 
Zealand but, where appropriate, reference 
wtll be made also to the expenence of 
other countnes 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN 
NEW ZEALAND 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
lndustnal Relations 1n New Zealand has 
throughout thts century been characterised 
by a highly developed legal system regu-
lating collective disputes In the early 
1890's the trade untons of the country had 
taken a fearful hammenng from the 
employf!rs in a manttme dtspute which had 
started in New South Wales and spread to 
New Zealand As a direct result of the 
crushing vtctory enjoyed by the employers. 
there were considerable fears by the Liberal 
Government of the ttme that the way 
would be open for more unscrupulous 
employers to explott the situation and take 
advantage of the dtsarray and weak posi-
tton tn whtch the untons found themselves 
As a direct result, the first of the Industrial 
Conciliatton and Arb1trat10n Acts was pas-
sed in 1894 
That Act established a central Arbitration 
Court with wide powers to settle disputes 
that arose between employers and unions 
and also to lay down in the form of awards 
minimum wage rates and basic conditions 
of employment which were to operate in a 
parttcular industry where the employer or 
employers on the one hand and the union 
or unions on the other hand were unable to 
reach an agreement by way of collecttve 
bargaining. In addttton, the legislation 
enacted legal procedures by which collec-
ttve bargaining was to take place under 
the chairmanship of an independent concil-
Iator wherever employers and workers were 
unable to reach an immediate agreement. 
Wtth various ups and downs, the Indus-
trial Conciliation and Arbitration legislation 
operated fairly effectively from that time 
until the late 1960's. A number of important 
amendments were made to the Acts from 
t1me to time. mcludtng a requirement first 
enacted in the 1930's that workers In nn 
mdustry . covered by an award settled by 
the Arbttratton Court or by a collective 
agreement registered wtth the Registrar of 
the Court were reqUired to toin the trade 
unton whtch was a party to that award or 
agreement In 1973, the legislation was 
consolidated and re-enacted wi th modifica-
tions as the Industrial Relations Act 1973. 
In the years smce the Second World 
War. industnal stnfe in New Zealand has 
emerged and spread Previously, there had 
been comparatively few Industrial stop-
pages and indeed at dtfferent ti mes New 
Zealand had been held up to the world as 
betng a nation that was vtrtually stri ke-
free. In 1951 a major stoppage on the 
waterfront had led to the National Govern-
ment assumtng legal powers derived from 
national emergency leglslatt on which en-
abled the police and armed forces to crush 
the stnke and to remove key umon figures 
from thelf positions of office. The unions 
retlfed, beaten by the power of the State, 
but tn the early part of the 1960's an 
tncreasing number of stoppages over dls-
mtssals began to emerge. New Zealand 
dnfted Into a minor recession in 1967 and 
tn 1968 matters came to a head on the 
tndustrial front when the Arbitration Court 
accepted submissions from the Employers' 
Federatton and refused to make a cost of 
living indexatton award (in New Zealand 
called General Wage Order) on the grou nds 
that the economy could not bear such an 
mcrease. Industrial action which resulted 
saw the joinln!J of forces between the 
Employers· Federation and the Federation 
of Labour in what was termed the "unholy 
alliance" by the then Minister of Finance. 
A joint apolication was made to the Court 
for an order notwithstanding the earlier 
rejection. The Court (which is a tripartite 
body consisting of a Judge and two lay-
members nomineted respecttvely by the 
Employers' Federation and the Federation 
of Labour) this time granted a 5% General 
Wage Order by way of a majority decision, 
the Judge dissenting. 
Thereafter. the Federation of Labour 
(still smarttng from the original nil ord er 
and the Judge's continued dissention) 
made it platn that It would have as little 
to do with the Court In any of its JUrisdic-
tions as possible and would resort where-
ever possible to direct bargaining as a 
means of obtaining the. benefits that they 
sought or settling the dtsputes that arose. 
The next few years saw considerable con-
frontation between employers and unions 
and, certainly in the more militant lndus-
tnes 1n parttcular, legal procedures were 
commonly by-passed and disputes and 
claims settled in accordance with the rela-
99 
--
live industrial strength of the parties 
In 1971 the National Government intro-
duced into Parliament a Bill establishing a 
system of wage control restricting the 
tncreases which could be grven to award 
rates and to individual employees. A cen-
tral Tribunal, known as the Stabilisation 
of Aemuneralton Authority, was established 
from which approval was required before 
any wage •ncrease could be given. That 
Bill was duly passed by Parltament but, tn 
accordance with rts terms. It expired 12 
months later However. at that date further 
and similar wage controls were enacted 
by way of statutory regulation pursuant to 
general authonty given by the Econo~ic 
Stabilisation Act 1948 (which gave wrde 
powers to enact delegated legislation where 
necessary for the good of the economy) 
Those regulations remained in force, des-
pite union opposition and pressure. until 
the National Government of the day wa 
removed from oH1ce in the General Elect1on 
at the end of 1972. 
The incoming Labour Government at that 
time repealed the regulations and for a 
period of some months there were aga1n 
no direct controls over wage rates. This 
saw a time once more when the unions 
exerted their industrial strength and con· 
siderable gains were made by them in the 
form of large increases. Eventually, as 
Inflation began to bite. the Labour Govern-
ment was forced to bnng down its own 
regulations restricting wage increases. It 
endeavoured however to provide a degree 
of flexibility (which in practice often work-
ed inequitably) by allowing increases in 
certain exceptional cases to be passed on 
where approval was obtained from a cen-
tral Tribunal 
The situation at the moment therefore 
Is tnat direct legal controls 1n recent years 
have severely curtailed wage bargainmg 
The current econom1c depression and the 
threat of further legal control has in effect 
led to the dem1se of trad1t1onal un1on 
activity 1n th•s area_ While this IS true speci· 
fically of New Zealand. it IS suggested 1n 
this paper that, to the extent that compre~ 
hensive Government control over econom1c 
act1v1ty 1s rapidly becoming a permanent 
feature in all developed nations. so too 
is the ability of unions and employers to 
determine their own destiny in the settling 
Df wage rates restricted 
Wage controls were not the only threat 
to union activity in New Zealand in recent 
years. The increasing militancy of unions 
1n the late 1960's and through the 1970's 
also Inspired a reaction from the National 
Government, which had been re-elected at 
the end of 1975, in the form of the intra· 
duct1on of severe anti-strike measures. The 
Labour Government, whtch had held politi-
cal power in the preceding three years, 
had llberalised stnke laws in 1973 to g1ve 
umons greater legal freedom to take indus-
trial act1on. In 1976 however, the National 
Government introduced an amending Bill 
to the existing legislation contain1ng what 
were described by some as the toughest 
and most repressive anti-strike measures 
known in the world The Bill was referred 
to a Parliamentary select committee to 
hear limited submissions from Interested 
parties but the measures were eventually 
enacted. Oddly, not all of the changes 
were enacted as amendments to the Indus-
trial Relations Act: some of the provisions 
were tagged on to the Commerce Amend~ 
ment 8111 that was also before Parliament 
at that lime Labour's failure to halt the decline In 
New Zealand's economy saw a National 
Government re-elected in 1975 with a con-
tinuation of wage regulations (with some 
modifications) until the second-half of 
1977 At this time they were relaxed con-
Siderably but under public threat from the 
Government that, if unions were not mod-
erate In their claims. stricter controls would 
be reapplied. Rising unemployment 1n New 
Zealand In the last two years, together 
perhaps with the public statements of the 
Government, has In fact ensured that 
recent wage claims by the great majority 
of unions have been comparatively 
These new provisions warrant a closer 
examination. It is important to note first 
however that the oefinition of "stnke" con~ 
tained 1n the New Zealand lndustna/ Rela-
tions Act ts a very Wide one and cover• 
many forms of lndustrra/ action falling short 
of a complete stoppage, Including a work 
to rule. a go slow. a refusal to work over-
lime, the reduction of normal performance 
of work and a refusal to accept engage~ 
ment for any work in which the employees 
are usually employed 
The Commerce Amendment Act 1976 
made •t an offence to be a party to, incite, 
Instigate, aid or abet a stnke or a lock-out 
restrained. 
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which was not a dispute over an mdustnat 
matter, or whtch the employers and wor-
kers, or their respective untons, did not 
have the power to settle by agreement, or 
whtch was mtended to coerce the New 
Zealand Government (1n a capacity other 
than that of employer) etlher d~rectly or 
by mfilctmg tnconventence upon the com-
mumty. Thts provtston was atmed at what 
were called pollltcal stnkes and was a 
dtrect sequel to the taktng of mdustrial 
action by a number of untons 1n protest 
agamst tne berthmg at New Zealand ports 
of Amencan nuclear war ships at the 
tnvitation of the New Zealand Government. 
The section, apart from makmg such actton 
an offence, also provtded that any person 
suffenng or apprehendmg loss as a result 
of such actton was able to obtam any or 
all of the remedtes available in civil pro-
ceedmgs to the same extent as if the 
stnke or lock-out were a tort mdepend-
ently of the seclton (provtded only that no 
award of damages could be made against 
an mdtvtdual) . 
A further sectton in the Commerce 
Amendment Act gave the Arbitration Court 
the power to order that full work be re-
sumed where the public interest was 
affected as a result of industrial action. 
The sectton reqUired that the Court must 
make an order where it was satisfied that 
etther the economy of New Zealand (includ-
mg m parttcular 1ts export trade) or the 
economy of a partiCU lar tndustry or mdus-
tnes was or would be in the tmmedlate 
future substantially affected or, alternative-
ly, 1f the life, safety or health of members 
of the communtty was endangered . The 
Court was also gtven power to determine a 
procedure for the settlement of the issue 
of the stnke or lock-out and also to order 
the taktng of any necessary measures for 
the safety and health of workers concerned 
directly or tnd~rectly in the dispute. Finally, 
the Court was empowered to make orders 
for the cessation of any industrial action 
in the nature of a rollmg strike. Fatlure to 
comply with any order of the Court consti-
tuted an offence and 1n particular a breach 
of an order by a unton conferred a related 
liability on any members of the management 
committee of the union who wilfully failed 
to inform any worker bound by the order 
that fatlure to comply with it was declared 
"n offence 
The power given to the Court to order 
resumption of work appears to have been 
modelled on the cooling off provisions 
initially enacted in the United States and 
later provided in the United Kingdom Indus-
trial Relations Act of 1971. It will be recalled 
that, shortly after the latter provision was 
enacted, the Secretary of State applied to 
the United Kingdom Industrial Relations 
Court and obtained an order requiring 
striktng railway workers to resume work.S 
That action was then followed by a further 
application to the Court requiring a com-
pulsory ballot of the railway workers, the 
result of which was a declaration of over-
whelming support for the union's action In 
recommending the strlke.e 
In New Zealand an application for a 
resumption of work order Is able to be 
made by any Minister of the Crown, any 
person who proves to the Court that he Is 
directly affected by the strike or lock-out 
or by any organisation representing any 
person so affected. The first application 
to be made to the Court for such an order 
was made by an organisation called "Strike 
Free" which, led by a law student who had 
previously successfully obtained an injunc-
tion In the Supreme Court against striking 
bus drivers, held itself out as being a public 
interest group dedicated to eradicating and 
eliminating strikes from the country. Strike 
Free sought an order in respect of a 
freezing works stoppage that was occurring 
at the time, notwithstanding the fact that 
negotiations were well advanced for the 
settlement of the dispute. The Court refused 
to give an early fixture for the hearing of 
the application "nd, by the time it was 
heard, the strike had been concluded 
Strike Free nevertheless asked the Court to 
make an order on the grounds that the 
strike might reoccur The Court In turn 
invtted counsel for Strike Free to withdraw 
the application and, when on Instructions 
that invitation was rejected, the Court dls-
mtssed the application with a heavy order 
for costs against the organisation The 
view was also expressed obiter that it was 
doubtful whether an organisation of this 
kind came within the category of organl-
sattons which by the Act were empowered 
to make such applications. 
The legislative measures enacted In the 
last two years in New Zealand represent 
5-Secretlry ol State for Employment v ASLEF (1972) 2 OB 443 
&-Secretary ol St•t• for Employment v ASLEF (No . 2) (1972) 2 08 455 
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deliberate Government policy that indus· 
trial disputes and clatms should be dealt 
with totally within the industrial framework 
provided by law and that uncontrolled 
direct bargaining or Industrial action should 
be restricted so far as possible. The 
employers associations have not been slow 
to react to this development and have 
extended considerably the advocacy ser-
vices which they provide for their members 
There has thus quickly grown up a large 
body of full time paid employer advocates 
{not necessarily lawyers) who assume rep-
resentation of employers 1n disputes and 
claims heard by the Arbitration Court and 
before Conciliation Councils in the great 
majority of such cases. This development 
has not been without its difficulties, not the 
least of wh1ch has been the emergence 
In some instances of an incipient conflict 
of interest between the interests of the 
Individual employer and the collective inter-
ests of the employers· federation or associ-
ation as a whole 
There has been no comparable develop-
ment on the union side to the increase in 
judicial determination of disputes and 
claims. New Zealand unions by and large 
are not wealthy and union secretanes 
traditionally have been paid very small 
salaries and been largely unass1sted by 
qualified staff. With one or two exceptions. 
the standard of union advocacy has there-
fore tended to be low This has given 
employers an edge in the tightened legal 
system that now exists. It is ot interest 
that the present Government 1n another 
context has recently suggested that there 
may be a need for State advocacy services 
to represent workers who are not union-
lsed or adequately represented otherwise 
This suggestion has naturally met strong 
opposition from the unions who of course 
see it as an alternative to their own exist-
THE EROSION OF MANAGERIAL 
PREROGATIVE 
Historically employers have claimed 
certain basic and inalienable rights, includ-
Ing the right to hire and fire at will , the 
right to determine and organise systems 
of work, the right to direct producllon. the 
right to determine company policies relat-
Ing to production, marketing, investment 
and so forth and the right to maintain 
confidential knowledge on financial and 
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account1ng matters relating to the com-
pany's performance. In North Amenca such 
nghts have often been specifically preserv-
ed by provisions to that effect wntten into 
labour contracts. These rights are however 
currently under challenge by un10ns and 
workers tn many countries around the 
world 
In New Zealand the right to hire and 
ftre at will has already been subJected to 
legislative control At common law the 
worker who was dismissed had no remedy 
provided that he was g•ven due notice or 
paid in lieu of notice as required by taw 
The period of such notice was generally 
small and an employer was under no obli-
gation to provide reasons for the dismissal 
An amendment to the New Zealand Indus-
trial Conciliation and Arbitration Act in 1970 
however introduced a standard personal 
grievance procedure wh1ch was required to 
be inserted into all awards and registered 
collective agreements. The procedure could 
be invoked by a worker who had been 
unJustifiably dismissed or otherw1se treated 
1n a way to h1s detriment by action that 
was not common to other workers. The 
worker in the first instance had the right 
to take the matter up with his immediate 
supervisor with the intention that the dis-
pute or grievance should be settled as 
quickly and as near to 1ts ong1n as possible 
In the event that the matter was not settled 
in that way, the worker wac; required to 
report it to his union which could if it 
chose take it up with the employer If no 
settlement was reached at that stage. then 
the union could require the establishment 
of a grievance committee consisting of an 
equal number of representatives from each 
side cha1red by an independent conciliator 
(normally in practice a full time paid offic-
Ial employed through lhe Labour Depart-
ment) . Failing settlement, the matter could 
then be referred to the Arbitration Court 
which had power to order reinstatement 
of the employee and/or compensation, In-
cluding the Joss of any wages that may 
have been suffered 
In praclice this procedure has served 
to remove dismissal disputes from the area 
of strike action so that again legal proced-
ures. Institutions and precedents are 
mcreasingly playing a dominant part In the 
conduct of a particular area of industrial 
relations 
Employer or managerial prerogative In 
the other areas referred to currently rema1ns 
intact 1n New Zealand although murmurings 
from the unions are rising. In particular, 
overseas trends towards greater worker 
participation 1n company decision-making 
and the recent Bullock Report in the 
United Kingdom on Industrial Democracy, 
including as 1t does recommendations for 
lhe appointment of worker representatives 
on directors boards, is forcing unions in 
New Zealand to reassess their traditional 
stance in these areas. 
It should not necessarily be assumed 
however that the unions will wholeheartedly 
welcome such movements towards worker 
participation Overseas experience ol union 
or worker representatives appointed to the 
boards of compames has sometimes high-
lighted a conflict of loyalty and duty that 
can hamper such representatives. Many of 
the more militant umons perhaps feel that 
they stand to do better out of an arms 
length or adversary situation than they do 
from one where the exhortation is to work 
together towards a so-called common goal 
Further, authority of the union over the 
workers 1n a particular plant or enterprise 
may be undermined if the workers !ham-
selves are integrated into the company 
structure and take an active part in the 
decision making within that company . 
When productivity bargaining became popu-
lar in the United Kingdom and elsewhere 
in the 1960's union reaction ultimately be-
came hostile because of this very factor. 
The prognos1s for ga1ns in th1s area 
through union action may therefore not be 
wholly optimistic. It can consequently be 
predicted that in the long run there is 
likely to be greater change through legisla-
tion than by union agitation or bargaining . 
A lead already exists in this respect in 
certain western countries, notably those of 
Central and Northern Europe. The German 
systems of worker co-determination and 
the effect that they have had on company 
structures and managerial processes are 
well known and need not be traversed 
here. In a less drastic form a recently 
enacted Norwegian statute may provide a 
guide to what could occur in New Zealand 
and in other countries such as Australia 
and the United Kingdom 
The Worker Protection and Working 
Environment Act of 1977 imposes certain 
positive obligations on Norwegian employ-
ers to organise systems of work which will 
a1d the employees' opportunities for self-
determination and professional respo nsibil-
ity and which will avoid exposure of 
employees to undesirable physical or men-
tal strain. Undiversifieci repetitive work and 
work that is governed by machine or con-
tveyor belt in a manner in which the 
employees themselves are prevented from 
varying the speed of the work Is also 
specifically prohibited. 
If in time comprehensive legislation Is 
enacted providing institutional or structural 
change to companies and requiring a de-
gree of worker participation and Integration 
Into the policy or decision making areas of 
a company's activities, It would seem almost 
inevitable that the Industrial role of trade 
unions as it now exists will be threatened 
As indicated above and without necessarily 
claiming that unions are inherently antag-
onistic or unco-operative in their dealings 
with employers, their traditional stance 
nevertheless has been one of negotiation 
from an arms length position . Inevitably 
this has meant there has been an in-built 
element of conflict in employer/union 
relationships. The concept of joint decision 
making runs against this trait. Similarly, 
trade union officials have been the repre-
sentatives of the worker members of their 
unions. While of course they derive their 
authority to act from the membership, 
nevertheless the conduct of negotiations 
and the decisions as to tactics and other 
matters of strategy have been taken by the 
union officials. This is the job of course 
that they are employed to do. Worker par-
ticipation however involves the workers 
themselves in the particular factory or 
enterprise taking a part with the managers 
in the decisions that are to be taken for 
the common good. The roles of the outside 
union officials are clearly limited In such 
circumstances, as was the case in company 
productivity bargaining and Implementation 
What then would be the place of trade 
unions if systems of worker participation 
became widespread and indeed mandat-
ory as a result of legislation? I suggest that 
the role of trade unions (and their counter-
part employers' organisations) in the field 
of industrial relations would largely cease 
to exist and would be replaced by enter-
pnse or factory based representative com-
mittees or groups which might or might 
not have some allegiance to Industry 
councils consistmg of representatives from 
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different factories and formed more for the 
purpose of the exchange of information 
rather than for the purpose of representa-
tion as It presently exists. Unions as such 
may well survive but with more restricted 
functions of a social or co-operative kind. 
Certainly, in my view, their Industrial role 
and strength will be dissipated as worker 
rrghts and benefits are increasingly settled 
by legislation and through enterprise sys-
tems of JOint worker-employer decision-
making. 
The rights and entitlements of workers 
will therefore become the product of the 
State, exercising powers of patronage, 
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which might be extended or withheld at 
will. This Is not necessarily to say that any 
such development, with the attendant bene--
fits that might result, should not be encour-
aged in the absence of effective union 
action . However any decline in trade union 
Industrial power will have a correspondmg 
effect on the considerable political strength 
of the unions as one of the counterbalanc-
ing forces that offset Governmental or State 
power. Any resultant increase in the poli-
tical ability of the State to pass new laws 
to achieve its policy obJectives will accord-
Ingly have significance from the wider per-
spective of the rule of law as It operates 
In a Parliamentary democracy. (!;. 
